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WHEN EXEMPTIONS DISCRIMINATE: UNLAWFULLY
NARROW RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO VACCINATION
MANDATES BY PRIVATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
RONALD J. COLOMBO*
Numerous colleges and universities have imposed COVID-19
vaccination mandates upon their students. Most of these mandates
also include language purporting to recognize medical and religious
exemptions. With regard to religious exemptions, some are unjustly
discriminatory. Most notably, some give preference to students who
are members of organized religions over students who are not. And
even facially neutral exemptions can be administered in an unjustly
discriminatory way by, for example, giving preference to one set of
religious denominations over another, or by engaging in “religious
profiling” (whereby students of a particular denomination are held
completely beholden to the beliefs of that denomination, as
ascertained by the school’s administration, despite their own sincere
and genuine religious beliefs to the contrary).
Students attending public colleges and universities have federal,
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constitutional, and statutory protections against such discrimination;
students attending private institutions do not. Rather, students
attending private colleges and universities are at the mercy of state
and local law and are afforded only those protections against
discrimination recognized by the jurisdiction in which their institution
is located.
State antidiscrimination law is unlikely to entitle students attending a
private college or university the right to a religious exemption from a
COVID-19 vaccination mandate. But to the extent that state law
generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, a religious
exemption to a private college or university vaccination mandate must
be religiously neutral and must not discriminate against students
whose opposition to the vaccine stems from divergent religious beliefs.
Although the research and insights presented herein should be
applicable, in whole or in part, to any state with antidiscrimination
laws protecting college students, this Article’s focus will be on New
York’s Human Rights Law. It will demonstrate the ways in which
religious exemptions can and do violate the law by illegally
discriminating against students on the basis of religion. It will
examine one particularly ill-advised and problematic policy (Hofstra
University’s) and also showcase a policy that comports with better
practices (Syracuse University’s).

INTRODUCTION
An internet meme that made the rounds during the height of the
COVID-19 pandemic featured the familiar painting “Washington as
Statesman at the Constitutional Convention” by Junius Brutus Stearns
with the words: “Just to be clear none of this matters if there is a virus.”1

1. COVID-19 Meme Version of Junius Brutus Stearns’s Painting “Washington as
Statesman at the Constitutional Convention” (illustration), in Jon Caldara, Caldara: Don’t
Forfeit
Freedoms
to
Fear,
COMPLETE
COLO.
(Dec.
23,
2020),
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The meme derides the dramatic curtailment of the individual rights
and liberties of Americans throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, ranging
from the shuttering of houses of worship,2 to limitations on the number of
individuals permissible in one’s own home,3 to the requirement to wear
masks in public.4
https://pagetwo.completecolorado.com/2020/12/23/caldara-dont-forfeit-freedoms-to-fear/
[https://perma.cc/VV3Q-C34N]. For the original painting, and some background information
relating thereto, see George Washington Series by Junius Brutus Stearns, JOY OF MUSEUMS
VIRTUAL TOURS, https://joyofmuseums.com/museums/united-states-of-america/richmondvirginia-museums/virginia-museum-of-fine-arts/washington-series-by-junius-brutus-stearns
[https://perma.cc/6YP4-AL2N].
2. See generally Considerations for Communities of Faith, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Feb.
19,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/faith-based.html [https://perma.cc/Q5FF-JG85]; VALERIE C. BRANNON,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10450, UPDATE: BANNING RELIGIOUS ASSEMBLIES TO STOP THE
SPREAD OF COVID-19 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10450
[https://perma.cc/NB9D-QWVJ]; Michael Gryboski, 1 in 5 Churches Facing Permanent
Closure Within 18 Months Due to COVID-19 Shutdowns: Barna Pres., CHRISTIAN POST (Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.christianpost.com/news/1-in-5-churches-face-closure-within-18months-due-to-covid-19-shutdowns-barna-president.html
[https://perma.cc/BP2X-CDCC].
See also Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (mem.) (denying
petitioners’ application to enjoin Governor Steve Sisolak from enforcing an executive order
limiting house of worship capacity); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct.
63 (2020) (enjoining Governor Andrew Cuomo from enforcing his executive order’s ten- and
twenty-five-person occupancy limits on the Diocese); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (enjoining Governor Gavin Newsom from enforcing
California’s total ban on indoor religious worship); Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021)
(granting injunctive relief from a California regulation that had the effect of restricting at-home
Bible studies and prayer meetings by limiting all gatherings in private homes to no more than
three households at a time).
3. See generally Guidance for Organizing Large Events and Gatherings, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 20, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/large-events/considerations-for-events-gatherings.html
[https://perma.cc/YE7G-SCST]; Small and Large Gatherings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-lifecoping/holidays/small-gatherings.html [https://perma.cc/G8NK-9BCF]; Restrictions on Public
Gatherings in the COVID-19 Pandemic, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 19, 2020),
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/public-gathering-rules-covid?time=2020-09-19
[https://perma.cc/2DL2-P9EQ]; 2020 COVID-19 State Restrictions, Re-Openings, & Mask
Requirements, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, https://www.nashp.org/2020-statereopening-chart/ [https://perma.cc/VU46-V9N2]; Elise Schoening & Lizzie Wilcox, State-byState Status Updates on Gathering Restrictions, NORTHSTAR MEETINGS GRP. (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://www.northstarmeetingsgroup.com/News/Industry/Coronavirus-states-cities-reopeningCOVID-19-new-cases [https://perma.cc/R5NY-XA33]. See also Tommy Beer, Supreme Court
Rules California Must Allow In-Home Religious Gatherings, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2021, 10:53
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2021/04/10/supreme-court-rules-californiamust-allow-in-home-religious-gatherings/ [https://perma.cc/4WHZ-8S5Q] (reporting upon the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision striking down California’s restrictions on in-home religious
gatherings).
4. See generally Use Masks to Slow the Spread of COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
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Such responses to a crisis are not without precedent. President
Lincoln suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus during the Civil War,5 the
Great Depression prompted the imposition of groundbreaking regulations
upon business and commerce,6 World War II saw the construction of
detention facilities for Japanese Americans,7 the Red Scare gave rise to
McCarthyism,8 and the 9/11 attacks introduced America to
waterboarding,9 the Patriot Act,10 and the Guantanamo Bay prison.11

ncov/prevent-getting-sick/diy-cloth-face-coverings.html
[https://perma.cc/EZ75-8W6];
Guidance for Wearing Masks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-coverguidance.html [https://perma.cc/557B-73D8]; Marie Fazio, How Mask Guidelines Have
Evolved, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/science/face-maskguidelines-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/5LNU-D9WU]; Kaia Hubbard, These States Have
COVID-19 Mask Mandates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 12, 2021, 10:29 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/these-are-the-states-with-mask-mandates
[https://perma.cc/2PMQ-32F9].
5. See Scott Bomboy, Lincoln and Taney’s Great Writ Showdown, NAT’L CONST. CTR.:
CONST. DAILY. (May 28, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/lincoln-and-taneys-greatwrit-showdown [https://perma.cc/5BYA-FBZN].
6. See generally Gary Richardson, The Great Depression, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22,
2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-depression [https://perma.cc/5AU5TFY7]; Study Aid: New Deal Legislation, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST.,
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/teaching-resource/study-aid-new-deallegislation [https://perma.cc/52WX-6S4K]. See also Stephen Greene, The Emergency Banking
Act of 1933, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/
emergency-banking-act-of-1933 [https://perma.cc/WPP6-EDFE]; Julia Maues, Banking Act of
1933
(Glass-Steagall),
FED.
RSRV.
HIST.
(Nov.
22,
2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass-steagall-act
[https://perma.cc/G2MTJQGS]; Gary Richardson et al., Gold Reserve Act of 1934, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold-reserve-act
[https://perma.cc/957KMPDM]; Gary Richardson et al., Banking Act of 1935, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking-act-of-1935
[https://perma.cc/YQ73849Q].
7. See Japanese-American Internment During World War II, NAT’L ARCHIVES (July 8,
2021), https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation
[https://perma.cc/QS9K-47AX].
8. See McCarthyism / the “Red Scare,” EISENHOWER LIBR., https://
www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/mccarthyism-red-scare
[https://perma.cc/8QK2-LF9B].
9. See Elisa Epstein, CIA Contractor Details Torture of 9/11 Suspects, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Jan. 27, 2020, 6:26 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/27/cia-contractordetails-torture-9/11-suspects [https://perma.cc/7LSZ-KWR3].
10. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict,
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 101–06, 201–16).
11. See Jeannette L. Nolen, Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp, BRITANNICA (Mar. 13,
2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Guantanamo-Bay-detention-camp
[https://perma.cc/SFQ7-F64F]. See generally The Post-9/11 Era (Sept. 2001–Present):
Legislative Materials, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/post-911-era-september-2001–-present-legislative-materials [https://perma.cc/5WG2-DJYD].
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In time, some of these actions, including ones taken during the current
pandemic, were declared unconstitutional.12 But not all were undertaken
by public authorities. The McCarthy Era was, for example, characterized
by private blacklists as much as by anything else.13 The aftermath of 9/11
included ugly acts of private discrimination against Muslim Americans.14
Victims of these nongovernmental harms are not protected by the U.S.
Constitution, but rather must look for redress elsewhere.15
This Article examines one particular category of victims of private
misconduct during the continuing COVID-19 pandemic: religious
students attending private universities and colleges. A large number of
12. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional designation of
legislative authority); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)
(declaring the Frazier–Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act to be in violation of the Fifth Amendment);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending powers); R.R. Ret. Board v.
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 because of
due process violations and because it was not a regulation of interstate commerce); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 exceeded the bounds of Congress’s Commerce Clause power); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute applied extraterritorially and was not
dependent upon U.S. citizenship and concluding that detainees at Guantanamo were “entitled
to invoke the federal courts’ authority under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that Hamdi, a U.S. citizen being detained indefinitely at Guantanamo
as an unlawful enemy combatant, was entitled to some due process guarantees); Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo prisoners had a constitutional right to the
writ of habeas corpus and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional
suspension of that right); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y. v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63
(2020) (enjoining Governor Andrew Cuomo from enforcing his executive order’s ten- and
twenty-five-person occupancy limits on the Diocese); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (enjoining California Governor Gavin Newsom from enforcing
California’s total ban on indoor religious worship); Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021)
(granting injunctive relief against a California regulation that had the effect of restricting athome Bible studies and prayer meetings by limiting all gatherings in private homes to no more
than three households at a time).
13. See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, Blacklists and Other Economic Sanctions, in THE
AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HIST. WITH DOCUMENTS (St. Martin’s Press 1994); Allison
Perlman, Hollywood Blacklist, BRITANNICA (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Hollywood-blacklist [https://perma.cc/PV5Q-94MS].
14. See Lenna Jawdat, Experiences of Discrimination Among Arab Americans and
Muslim Americans Post-9/11 Attacks 3–6 (2012) (M.A. thesis, Smith College)
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1973&context=theses
[https://perma.cc/L9T9-KRRH]; Rebecca A. Clay, Muslims in America, Post 9/11, AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N (Sept. 2011), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/09/Muslims [https://perma.cc/5JYXCKRX].
15. For a brief discussion of when private action is deemed “government action,” see
infra text accompanying notes 25–28. For a more thorough analysis of the state action doctrine
see Ronald J. Colombo, Corporate Entanglement with Religion and the Suppression of
Expression, 45 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Corporate Entanglement
with Religion], https://ssrn.com/abstract=3867663 [https://perma.cc/K6BX-D7K5].
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private universities and colleges adopted COVID-19 vaccination
mandates as a condition of attendance16—mandates that a significant
number of students cannot comply with because of their sincerely held
religious beliefs against vaccinations in general or the COVID-19
vaccines in particular. Lacking recourse to either the U.S. Constitution or
federal civil rights legislation, aggrieved students are left at the mercy of
whatever rights are afforded to them under state law. For over 500,000
private college and university students,17 this means New York State law,
the focus of this Article.18
New York law does not apparently require private colleges and
universities to promulgate religious exemptions to vaccination mandates,
but it does prohibit such institutions from discriminating against its
students on the basis of religion.19 Consequently, if a private, higher
educational institution adopts a religious exemption to a vaccination
mandate, that exemption must be nondiscriminatory—both facially and as
applied. Although this conclusion represents a rather natural, logical
application of New York’s Human Rights Law,20 this precise issue seems
to be a matter of first impression in New York. Perhaps this explains why
numerous New York private colleges and universities have articulated
religious exemption policies that by their very terms violate New York
law by discriminating against students on the basis of religion.21
16. See Chris Burt, State-By-State Look at Colleges Requiring COVID-19 Vaccines: The
Complete List of Higher Education Institutions Mandating Vaccination for the Fall 2021-22
Semester, UNIV. BUS. (Oct. 12, 2021), https://universitybusiness.com/state-by-state-look-atcolleges-requiring-vaccines/ [https://perma.cc/TQ9G-J2DL].
17. See NY State Higher Education Enrollment (2019–20), N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T,
https://data.nysed.gov/highered-enrollment.php [https://perma.cc/Q9U9-U7Y7].
18. Although this Article focuses on New York’s antidiscrimination law, its insights
should be applicable, in whole or in part, to the law of any state that prohibits discrimination
against college and university students on the basis of religion. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 220
(Deering 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (Deering 2021); 14-200 DEL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 225 (2021) (providing that no person in Delaware be excluded, or denied benefits, of any
program or activity receiving approval or financial assistance from or through the State of
Delaware on the basis of religion); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909
(2021); IOWA CODE § 216.9 (LexisNexis 2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4601-02 (West
2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 37.2402 (LexisNexis 2021); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.13
(West 2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (2021); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (Consol. 2021);
OR. REV. STAT. § 659.850 (2021); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5003–5004 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-1-435 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2021); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 25,
§§ 1401–1402 (2021) (prohibiting religious discrimination in a place of public
accommodation); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3904 (2021) (prohibiting religious discrimination in a
place of public accommodation).
19. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(4) (McKinney 2018).
20. See EXEC. §§ 290–301.
21. See, e.g., HOFSTRA UNIV., REQUEST AND CERTIFICATION—RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION
FROM COVID-19 VACCINE REQUIREMENT [hereinafter REQUEST AND CERTIFICATION],
https://www.hofstra.edu/sites/default/files/2021-05/religious-exemption-covid-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EM4-MDTJ].

COLOMBO (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/25/22 9:23 AM

WHEN EXEMPTIONS DISCRIMINATE

299

This Article will proceed in five Parts followed by a conclusion. Part
I will address the civil rights of students at private colleges and
universities under federal law. Part II will set forth the right, under New
York law, of students at private colleges and universities to be free from
unjust discrimination on the basis of religion. Part III will survey relevant
precedent to establish that a religious exemption to vaccination
requirements, if not religiously neutral, constitutes unjust discrimination
in violation of New York law (and, accordingly, under functionally
equivalent laws enacted by other jurisdictions). Included in this survey
will be precedent construing the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
Although the First Amendment is not generally applicable to private
actors such as nonpublic colleges and universities, it precludes the
government from discriminating on the basis of religion and, as such,
provides helpful and persuasive authority on what constitutes
discrimination. Part IV will address how otherwise facially lawful
exemption policies could be administered in an unlawful way. Part V will
review the religious exemption regime applicable to state-mandated
vaccines in New York. This Part will then compare two paradigmatic
religious exemptions promulgated by New York schools in response to
their private imposition of a COVID-19 vaccine mandate: one from
Syracuse University22 and one from Hofstra University.23 The Syracuse
exemption, at least as written, serves as a blueprint for institutions to
follow, as its nondiscriminatory nature conforms well to the requirements
of New York’s Human Rights Law.24 Conversely, the Hofstra policy,
facially repugnant to New York’s Human Rights Law, exemplifies the
inappropriately discriminatory approach adopted by some institutions—a
vivid example of what not to do.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
When it comes to the issue of religious liberty, students at private
colleges and universities are among some of the least protected members
of American society. Two factors contribute to this state of affairs.
The first is that, as private institutions, such colleges and universities
are not organs or instrumentalities of the government. This removes them
from the reach of the protections enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.25
22. See SYRACUSE UNIV., COVID-19 VACCINATION—EXEMPTION REQUEST AND
WAIVER OF RESPONSIBILITY (May 3, 2021) [hereinafter WAIVER OF RESPONSIBILITY],
[https://perma.cc/FLU8-G2P9].
23. See REQUEST AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 21.
24. See EXEC. §§ 290–301.
25. Students at public colleges and universities do have rights protected by the First
Amendment. See Gregg E. Clifton, University Policy Mandating COVID-19 Vaccines for
Student-Athletes Blocked by Sixth Circuit, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 11, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/university-policy-mandating-covid-19-vaccines-
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Under the “state action doctrine,” private institutions can, under certain
circumstances, be treated like government actors for constitutional
This doctrine, however, has been ill-defined and
purposes.26
unpredictably applied, prompting one commentator to write: “There is
little coherence to the Supreme Court’s State action jurisprudence.”27 In
any event, the doctrine is most likely inapplicable to private colleges and
universities.28
Second, regarding the vast regime of federal civil rights legislation,
the protection of students from religious discrimination is an unfortunate
lacuna.29 Private institutions receiving federal funding are prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex,
disability, and age—but not religion.30 This was no mere oversight, as
apparently the omission of religious discrimination within the ambit of
prohibitions set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and
future amendments to date) resulted from concerns over how such a
prohibition would affect sectarian schools.31
In contrast to the treatment of students, employees are protected from
religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,32 and all
persons are protected from religious discrimination in places of public

student-athletes-blocked-sixth-circuit [https://perma.cc/7GCJ-WA4Q] (reporting upon the
Sixth Circuit’s decision upholding a district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction
predicated upon Western Michigan University’s alleged violation of its students’ First
Amendment rights). Conversely, individuals are not protected by the Constitution from the
actions of nonpublic (private) entities. See John Balitis & Michael Bohan, Protest: A Path to
Unemployment?, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Dec. 2017, at 34, 35–36, https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/
PDF_Articles/1217Protest.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYY6-YVSN].
26. Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 128–
29 (2004).
27. Eric Sirota, Can the First Amendment Save Net Neutrality?, 70 BAYLOR L. REV. 781,
841 (2018). For a more thorough analysis of the state action doctrine see Corporate
Entanglement with Religion, supra note 15.
28. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 619–23 (N.J. 1980).
29. See Joshua C. Weinberger, Comment, Religion and Sex in the Yale Dorms: A
Legislative Proposal Requiring Private Universities to Provide Religious Accommodations, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 205, 219–23 (1988); see also Religious Discrimination, OFF. FOR C.R., U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/religion.html
[https://perma.cc/XQ4F-ABEX] (“None of the laws that [the Office for Civil Rights] enforces
expressly address religious discrimination.”).
30. See Kenneth L. Marcus, The Most Important Right We Think We Have but Don’t:
Freedom from Religious Discrimination in Education, 7 NEV. L.J. 171, 172 (2006).
31. See id. at 174. There are, of course, ways to address these concerns while still
protecting the vast majority of students from discrimination on the basis of religion. See, e.g.,
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(37) (McKinney 2018) (excluding from the definition of covered
“educational institution[s],” sectarian schools). But Congress, alas, has lacked either the will or
creativity to devise one. See id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights Act.33 Although “public
accommodation” might sound like a promising avenue for students, that
term has been narrowly interpreted to cover only “five categories of
establishments: ‘lodgings; facilities principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or
entertainment;’ and establishments located within covered establishments
and open to the public.”34 Students who suffer from religious
discrimination with regard to university housing, dormitories, and eateries
would appear to have a cause of action against a wrongdoer under Title
II35—but this question has not be resolved definitively.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS UNDER NEW YORK LAW
New York, like most other states, has enacted legislation to
supplement the federal constitutional and statutory civil rights of its
residents.36 New York’s legislation is known as the state’s “Human
Rights Law,” and was enacted “to eliminate and prevent discrimination in
employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, in
educational institutions, in public services, in housing accommodations,
in commercial space and in credit transactions . . . .”37
The law declares equality of opportunity to be a “civil right” and,
regarding education, declares:
The opportunity to obtain education . . . without discrimination
because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation,
gender identity or expression, military status, sex, marital status, or
disability, as specified in section two hundred ninety-six of this article,
is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right.38

“Educational institutions” are defined by the statute to include (of
relevance to this Article) “any education corporation or association which
holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation

33. § 2000a(a).
34. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws,
60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 639–40 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)); see also Tara E.
Thompson, Comment, Locating Discrimination: Interactive Web Sites as Public
Accommodations Under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409, 412 (2002).
35. See Religious Discrimination, supra note 29.
36. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290–301 (McKinney 2018); Civil Rights Laws and
Legislation,
NAT’L
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Jan.
16,
2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/civil-rights-laws-and-legislation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/826N-QZU4].
37. EXEC. § 290(3).
38. Id. § 291(2). New York is not alone in prohibiting religious discrimination in the
context of higher education. See supra note 18.
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pursuant to the provisions of article four of the real property tax law.”39
This encompasses nonprofit, non-sectarian private universities and
colleges.40
The operative provision of New York’s Human Rights Law
protecting college and university students is set forth in section 296(4),
and reads, in its entirety, as follows:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an educational
institution to deny the use of its facilities to any person otherwise
qualified, or to permit the harassment of any student or applicant, by
reason of his race, color, religion, disability, national origin, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, age or
marital status, except that any such institution which establishes or
maintains a policy of educating persons of one sex exclusively may
admit students of only one sex.41

Liability under the Human Rights Law extends not only to the
institution ultimately responsible for prohibited misconduct. The law
defines as “an unlawful discriminatory practice” the act of any person “to
aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden
under this article, or to attempt to do so.”42 This should give pause to
administrators who implement unlawful policies,43 or who would
implement lawful policies unlawfully.44
Because the Human Rights Law is a “remedial statute,” its terms
“must be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficial purposes, one of
which is to eliminate discrimination in educational institutions.”45 To do
this, however, we must first ascertain whether the understanding of
“discrimination” under the Human Rights Law is somehow idiosyncratic.
That is, whether the Human Rights Law employs a particularized
definition of “discrimination,” separate and apart from how most courts
have defined the term. By all indications, it does not.
The term “discrimination” first appears in section 290(3) of the law,
as part of its statement of purposes.46 As mentioned earlier, the stated
purposes of the Act include the objective to “eliminate and prevent
discrimination” in various areas, including education.47 Thereafter, it

39. EXEC. § 292(37).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. Univ. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts., 378 N.Y.S.2d 842, 847 (Sup.
Ct.), aff’d, 373 N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 1975).
41. EXEC. § 296(4).
42. Id. § 296(6).
43. See infra Section III.C.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. 18 N.Y. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 28 (2021).
46. EXEC. § 290(3).
47. Id.
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appears in section 291 where the law declares that “[e]quality of
opportunity” is a civil right.48
The term “discrimination,” however, is not itself defined. Rather, the
definitional section of the law—section 292(4)—defines the term
That term, “unlawful
“unlawful discriminatory practice.”49
discriminatory practice,” encompasses conduct prohibited by the law, and
is defined as including “only those practices specified” in certain operative
sections of the law (namely, sections 296, 296-a, 296-c, and 296-d).50 And
this returns us, for our purposes, to section 296(4), quoted above.51
Section 296(4) carves out from otherwise prohibited conduct those
institutions that have a “policy of educating persons of one sex
exclusively”; they may admit students of only one sex.52 Every other
educational institution is precluded from “deny[ing] the use of its
facilities,” to “any person otherwise qualified” (or to “permit the
harassment of any student or applicant”) on the basis of (“by reason of”)53
the enumerated prohibited characteristics: “race, color, religion, disability,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military
status, sex, age or marital status.”54
Denying a student, who is otherwise qualified, use of school facilities
“by reason of” that student’s religion would exemplify the dictionary
definition of discrimination: “to make a distinction in favor of or against
a person or thing on the basis of the group, class, or category to which the
person or thing belongs, rather than according to actual merit.”55
Consequently, a policy, practice, or course of conduct found to constitute
discrimination elsewhere, under some other regime’s laws or regulations,
should—all things being equal—be found to constitute discrimination in
New York if committed by an educational institution against one of its
students.
Might there be some wiggle room for discrimination against students
in educational institutions that falls outside the purview of section
296(4)’s prohibition on “deny[ing] the use of its facilities” or “permit[ing]
the harassment of any student or applicant”?56 The law would most clearly
appear to cover discriminating with respect to admission decisions, access
to courses and classrooms, participation in campus activities, and similar
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 291.
Id. § 292(4).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
EXEC. § 296(4).
Id.
Id.
Discriminate, WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1989).
56. Neither “facilities” nor “harassment” is defined by the Human Rights Law. See EXEC.
§ 292.
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undertakings. Might it plausibly allow an educational institution to assign
inferior grades to a student on account of his or her religion? Or withhold
the conferral of a diploma on account of race or sex? The literal text of
the statute would seem to permit such misconduct, but it is nearly
impossible to imagine that a court would sanction any such things,
especially in light of the requirement to “liberally construe[]” the law’s
terms.57
As becomes quickly apparent, therefore, New York’s Human Rights
Law fills the gap in federal civil rights legislation by providing college
and university students powerful protections against discrimination on the
part of the schools they attend or seek to attend.
III.
THE UNLAWFULNESS OF DISCRIMINATORY RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS TO VACCINE MANDATES AT PRIVATE COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES UNDER NEW YORK’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Part II having set forth New York’s prohibition on religious
discrimination in private higher education,58 this Part III will apply that
prohibition to the question of religious exemptions to vaccine mandates.
It will first, however, contextualize the question by briefly discussing
vaccine mandates per se at private colleges and universities. Next, it will
address the issue of religious discrimination in the promulgation of
exemptions as a general matter. In its final Section, this Part will examine
the issue of religious discrimination in the promulgation of exemptions to
vaccine mandates in particular.
A. Vaccine Mandates at Private Colleges and Universities
Before delving into the question of religious exemptions to vaccine
mandates at private colleges and universities, let us first contextualize the
issue by briefly addressing private collegiate vaccine practices in general.
Under state law, in New York and elsewhere, a short list of
immunizations is necessary as a condition of college or university
attendance.59 New York’s list includes measles, mumps, and rubella.60
Added to this list is meningococcal disease (meningitis),61 but with a twist:
a student may attend college in New York without immunization against
meningococcal disease if—after receiving information about the disease

57. 18 N.Y. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 28 (2021).
58. See supra Part II.
59. See State Laws and Mandates by Vaccine, IMMUNIZATION ACTION COAL. (May 24,
2021), https://www.immunize.org/laws/ [https://perma.cc/UZ36-E66W]; see also 166 AM. JUR.
Trials 353 (2020).
60. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2165(1)(d) (McKinney 2020).
61. Id. § 2167(1)(c).
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from his or her school—the students submits a signed acknowledgment
indicating that they will not be receiving the vaccine.62
Against that backdrop, a number of private colleges and universities
have historically imposed immunization requirements beyond that which
are required by the states in which they are located.63 Notwithstanding
this well-established practice, it is far from clear that private colleges and
universities can impose a vaccination requirement upon their students
with regard to any vaccine at any time.64 The COVID-19 vaccination
mandates were not rolled out as a condition of admittance only for new
students, but rather as a condition of return for continuing students as
well.65 And with regard to new students, in many cases the mandate was
announced well after incoming freshmen had already made their
matriculation choices.66
Under the law of New York and other states, students stand in a
contractual relationship with their respective colleges/universities.67
62. Id. § 2167(3)(b).
63. Allison Noesekabel & Ada M. Fenick, Immunization Requirements of the Top 200
Universities: Implications for Vaccine-Hesitant Families, 35 VACCINE 3661, 3665 (2017)
(stating that “nearly half of elite universities have implemented more vaccination requirements
than legally required”).
64. See I. Glenn Cohen & Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Can Colleges and Universities Require
Student Covid-19 Vaccination?, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/can-colleges-and-universities-require-student-covid-19vaccination/ [https://perma.cc/7JSY-2HME].
65. See Zamira Rahim, US Colleges Will Require Students To Be Vaccinated, Despite
State Policies, CNN (Apr. 9, 2021, 8:39 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/09/
world/coronavirus-newsletter-intl-04-09-21/index.html.
66. See COVID-19 Vaccine Required for In-Person SUNY, Hofstra Students This Fall,
Officials Say, NEWSDAY (May 10, 2021, 8:33 PM), https://www.newsday.com/news/health/
coronavirus/covid-19-vaccine-requirement-suny-1.50242180 [https://perma.cc/DCL5-V6KY].
Hofstra University, for example, announced its novel COVID-19 vaccination mandate in May
2021—well after most high school seniors had decided upon which college to attend in the fall.
Id.
67. Rolph v. Hobart & William Smith Colls., 271 F. Supp. 3d 386, 405 (W.D.N.Y. 2017).
The court explained:
Under New York law, an implied contract is formed when a university accepts
a student for enrollment: if the student complies with the terms prescribed by the
university and completes the required courses, the university must award him a
degree. The terms of the implied contract are contained in the university’s
bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the student. Implicit in the
contract is the requirement that the institution act in good faith in its dealing with
its students. At the same time, the student must fulfill his end of the bargain by
satisfying the university’s academic requirements and complying with its
procedures.
Id. (quoting Papelino v. Albany Coll. Of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 93 (2nd Cir.
2011); see Dasrath v. Ross Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 07CV2433CBARER, 2008 WL 11438041,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2008) (“Under New York law, a student may sue his school for breach
of contract.”); see also Laura Krugman Ray, Toward Contractual Rights for College Students,
10 J.L. & EDUC. 163, 167 (1981).
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Basic contract law principles ordinarily preclude one party from
unilaterally modifying the terms of contract without the assent of the
other.68 To circumvent this, colleges typically inform students that they
reserve the right “to change any of the statements, procedures, regulations,
fees, or conditions” pertaining to enrollment “without prior notice,” and
assert the right to do so in a way that “affect[s] all actively enrolled
students who have not yet graduated.”69 Whether this power is as
unlimited as asserted is outside the scope of this Article.
Further, unlike every other vaccination mandate previously imposed
upon students, the COVID-19 mandates originally required the injection
of a vaccine not yet fully approved by the Food and Drug Administration,
but rather only permitted via an “Emergency Use Authorization.”70 That
itself presented a novel situation which, according to some commentators,
rendered the COVID-19 mandates entirely unlawful.71 Nevertheless, in
the months that followed the FDA did grant full approval for one COVID19 vaccine (Pfizer-BioNTech),72 and presumably others will follow. As
such, the question of the legality of religious exemptions remains one of
primary importance.
B. Religious Discrimination in the Promulgation of Exemptions
Generally
There is extremely little direct precedent, and apparently none in New
York, bearing upon the specific issue of discriminatory religious
exemptions to private vaccination requirements promulgated by
educational institutions. Indeed, there are few reported cases of religious
discrimination claims brought against educational institutions under New
York’s Human Rights Law at all.
Regarding vaccination exemptions, perhaps the answer lies in the
novelty of the present situation. Some, if not most, institutions appear to
68. Beacon Term. Corp. v. Chemprene, Inc., 429 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (App. Div. 1980)
(“Fundamental to the establishment of a contract modification is proof of each element requisite
to the formulation of a contract, including mutual assent to its terms.”).
69. HOFSTRA UNIV., GUIDE TO PRIDE STUDENT HANDBOOK 2021–2022 3 (2021),
https://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/studentaffairs/deanofstudents/commstandards/commstandards_gu
idetopride.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY38-TCE3].
70. See Ameer Benno, Colleges and the COVID-19 Vaccine, N.Y. L.J. (July 9, 2021,
10:15 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/07/09/colleges-and-the-covid-19vaccine/?slreturn=20210818161744 [https://perma.cc/3NB6-MZRN] (“Requiring students to
take a COVID-19 vaccine while they are still in EUA status violates the law.”). But see Cohen
& Reiss, supra note 64 (“While we have concluded that, under the existing federal statutes and
case law, colleges and universities have broad discretion to require vaccination as a condition
of a full return to campus, there are admittedly areas where more clarity would be desirable.”).
71. See Benno, supra note 70.
72. FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 23.
2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-covid-19vaccine [https://perma.cc/ME8R-Q2AY].
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hew only to those immunization requirements imposed by state law.73
This in turn implicates well-established exemptions promulgated by the
state itself.74 For example, before the COVID-19 pandemic, Hofstra
University had not imposed upon its students vaccination requirements
beyond those of New York State.75 Consequently, Hofstra University had
not previously been responsible for promulgating its own religious
exemption policy to vaccination. As will be discussed, when pressed to
do so, Hofstra—as with some other schools—adopted a religious
exemption policy different than New York’s.76
In any event, the dearth of case law construing New York’s Human
Rights Law section 296(4)77 compels us to examine how religious
discrimination has been defined in other contexts as well. Featured most
prominently among these is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act—federal
legislation prohibiting religious discrimination in the context of
employment.78 New York courts have frequently entertained Title VII
employment discrimination claims together and simultaneously with
employment discrimination claims brought under New York’s Human
Rights Law. And in so doing, they have not suggested a divergent
definition or understanding of what constitutes “discrimination.”79
Indeed, employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII and
New York Human Rights Law claims are “all subject to the
[same] . . . analysis.”80
Also helpful is an exploration of cases arising under the religion
clauses of the First Amendment. This may seem—initially at least—
inapposite, as the religious clauses of the U.S. Constitution address the
relationship between citizen and state, and serve to constrain the power of
government.81 As mentioned, they do not ordinarily apply to restrict the
conduct of private actors.82 And certainly there is much in the way of First
Amendment jurisprudence that is indeed inapplicable to our present
inquiry. That said, a critical thread running through cases construing the
73. See, e.g., HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY WELCOME GUIDE 2020-2021 6 (2020),
https://media.intostudy.com/image/upload/intoStudy/downloads/welcome-guides/20202021/2020-202120Hofstra%20Welcome%20Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q33H-BJTF].
Immediately before the COVID pandemic, Hofstra, for example, only required those
vaccinations mandated by the State of New York. See id.
74. See infra Section V.A.
75. See supra note 3.
76. See infra Section V.C.
77. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(4) (McKinney 2018).
78. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
79. See, e.g., Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2003).
80. Siddiqi, 572 F. Supp. at 365.
81. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155–66 (2d ed. 1988).
82. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment is that of nondiscrimination and neutrality.83 In the
words of the Supreme Court: “the established principle [is] that the
Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward
religion.”84 Neutrality is, of course, presumptively the opposite of
discrimination; to discriminate is, as previously noted, “to make a
distinction in favor of or against a person or thing on the basis of the group,
class, or category to which the person or thing belongs, rather that
according to actual merit.”85 Thus, by including First Amendment case
law in our analysis, an additional universe of situations is made available
to us in which courts have examined whether a particular practice or
course of conduct constitutes discrimination. While not precedentially
binding, these cases are highly persuasive since they address largely
identical questions.86
As a threshold matter, nondiscrimination with respect to religion
requires “denominational neutrality.”87 To impose different standards
upon different religions “discriminates against” certain religions.88 This
rule applies not only to regulations in general, but also to the promulgation
and administration of exemptions to them. Admittedly, a conceptual
difficulty accompanies any religious exemption because it necessarily
makes distinctions among religions in a certain way: it serves to relieve a
burden imposed upon certain believers, leaving alone those believers upon
whom the burden in question is not imposed. And although some—
especially in the First Amendment context—have asserted that this
violates the Establishment Clause, this has not posed a difficulty to the
administration of exemptions or accommodations, nor has it been deemed
discriminatory.89
An important Supreme Court decision bearing upon the subject of
denominational neutrality is Larson v. Valente,90 and it bears close
scrutiny.

83. See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1160, 1162.
84. See id. at 1188 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985)).
85. Discriminate, supra note 55.
86. See David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A
Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 259–60 (1995) (explaining that both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause, at a minimum, “prohibit[] laws that
discriminate . . . against a particular religion”).
87. See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1190.
88. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 230, 255 (1982) (holding that imposing “certain
registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious organizations that solicit more
than fifty per cent [sic] of their funds from nonmembers discriminates against such
organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment”).
89. See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1188–89.
90. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 228.
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Larson concerned Minnesota’s “Charitable Solicitation Act,”
pursuant to which a number of significant burdens were placed upon
charitable organizations in the state:
A charitable organization subject to the Act must register with the
Minnesota Department of Commerce before it may solicit
contributions within the State. With certain specified exceptions, all
charitable organizations registering under [section] 309.52 must file
an extensive annual report with the Department, detailing, inter alia,
their total receipts and income from all sources, their costs of
management, fundraising, and public education, and their transfers of
property or funds out of the State, along with a description of the
recipients and purposes of those transfers. The Department is
authorized by the Act to deny or withdraw the registration of any
charitable organization if the Department finds that it would be in “the
public interest” to do so and if the organization is found to have
engaged in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices.91

The Act exempted from its provisions “religious organizations that
received more than half of their total contributions from members or
affiliated organizations.”92 This was known colloquially as the “fifty per
cent [sic] rule.”93 Unification Church, a religious organization that did not
qualify for the exemption on account of the fifty percent rule, brought suit
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.94
This statutory scheme, and its accompanying exemption, did not reek of
religious favoritism or hostility toward a particular denomination.95 Yet
it was struck down.96
The Larson Court began its discussion of the issue by proclaiming
that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”97 It
proceeded to hold that the “fifty per cent [sic] rule . . . clearly grants
denominational preferences of the sort consistently and firmly deprecated
in our precedents.”98 Consequently, the Court applied its most exacting
level of examination to the legislation—the strict scrutiny standard of the
compelling government interest test99—and concluded that it violated the
Constitution.100
91. Id. at 231 (internal citations omitted).
92. Id. at 231–32.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 232–33.
95. See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1192.
96. Larson, 456 U.S. at 255.
97. Id. at 244.
98. Id. at 246.
99. Id. at 246–47.
100. Id. at 255. Larson overruled, or confined to its particular factual circumstances, the
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Again, to be clear, private colleges and universities are not
government actors subject to the First Amendment. But discrimination is
discrimination; preferential treatment is preferential treatment. Larson
did not suggest that the concepts of “neutrality” or “preference” employed
in its holding were terms of art.101 Thus, if a private educational institution
operates in a state such as New York, in which legislation precludes
discrimination based on religion, a course of conduct parallel to that which
occurred in Larson should be found to constitute discriminatory,
preferential treatment.
Two lower court cases have addressed the question of discrimination
in religious exemptions. The most relevant is a rare case arising in part
under New York’s Human Rights Law: Siddiqi v. New York City Health
& Hospitals Corporation.102 Siddiqi was an employment discrimination
case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, New York City
Administrative Code section 8-107, and the New York Civil Rights Act
Siddiqi alleged, among other things, religious
section 296.103
discrimination on account of “unequal treatment based on religion.”104
More specifically, he alleged that his employer “refuse[d] to give Muslims
time off to observe their religious holidays but does give time off to
adherents to other religions.”105 The court held that, if proved, this would
constitute a form of discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment—an “impermissible favoring of one religious group over
another.”106
Similarly, in Booth v. Maryland, the plaintiff, a Rastafarian, alleged
that he was denied a religious exemption by his employer—the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services—with regard to

earlier case of Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Larson, 456 U.S. at 246–47, 246
n.23. In Gillette, the Court was more accommodating of denominational preferences (within
the context of the military during the Vietnam War). See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454. The only
other situation in which an exemption lacking denominational neutrality was upheld was in
Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992). Rupert upheld the
constitutionality of an exemption from the Bald Eagle Protection Act’s prohibition on the use
of eagle feathers for Native American religions, but not other religions. Id. at 35–36. The Court
justified this deviation from First Amendment jurisprudence due to the “unique legal status” of
Native Americans. See id. at 34 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974)).
101. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 228. Further, there is no reason to believe that New York’s
Human Rights Law derogates in its understanding of discrimination from that expressed in
Larson. See supra notes 45–56.
102. See Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
103. Id. at 357.
104. Id. at 369.
105. Id. at 371.
106. Id. Elsewhere, the court noted that Title VII and New York Human Rights Law
claims are adjudicated under the same standards. See id. at 365.
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its grooming policy.107 The plaintiff’s dreadlocks were deemed
unacceptable under the policy, and his request for an exemption was
denied—whereas both Jewish and a Sikh employees were granted
exemptions to the same policy on account of their beards.108 Although the
grooming policy was religiously neutral, and not problematic per se, the
Fourth Circuit held that this did not end the inquiry.109 The plaintiff had
a potentially cognizable claim that his employer unconstitutionally
engaged in religious discrimination by “favor[ing] other religions over his
religion” when it “granted religious exemptions to others who were
similarly situated to him” while denying his requests for an exemption.110
A case related to the issue of exemptions would be that of Church of
Scientology of Georgia Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs.111 The plaintiff in
that case, the Church of Scientology, submitted a rezoning application,
along with a request for certain zoning variances, to the city in order to
accommodate the expansion of its facilities.112 The plaintiff alleged that
it was “subjected to a higher scrutiny and a lengthier approval process than
other comparator churches” in connection with its zoning application.113
The plaintiff’s application “was delayed an additional five months beyond
the [one hundred and twenty] days typically required by the City for
zoning approval.”114 This, in conjunction with other allegations, was
deemed sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on whether defendant
had “acted with a discriminatory purpose” in handling the plaintiff’s
zoning application in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act.115
Although Siddiqi, Booth, and Church of Scientology are possible
examples of religious discrimination against particular faiths, it is
important to remember that—as Larson makes clear—such hostility is not
a necessary component to a religious discrimination case.116 This point
was driven home by Mandell v. County of Suffolk.117 In Mandell, the
plaintiff, a former deputy police inspector, established a prima facie case
of religious discrimination under both Title VII and the New York State
Human Rights Law by adducing evidence that his superior was biased in

107. Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 378 (4th Cir. 2003).
108. Id. at 380–81.
109. See id. at 381.
110. Id.
111. See Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d
1328 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
112. See id. at 1339–41.
113. Id. at 1372.
114. Id. at 1372–73.
115. Id. at 1376.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 95–100.
117. See Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2003).
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favor of a particular religion.118 As the Second Circuit explained, “to
establish a claim of religious discrimination, plaintiff does not have to
prove that defendants discriminated solely against his religion. An
employer discriminating against any non-Catholic violates the antidiscrimination laws no less than an employer discriminating only against
one discrete group, in this case, Jews.”119
Similarly, laws prohibiting religious discrimination “protect[] not
only people who belong to traditional, organized religions, such as
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism, but also others
who have sincerely held religious, ethical or moral beliefs.”120 Although
membership in an organized religion may be probative of the sincerity of
a person’s beliefs, “an individual need not be a member of an organized
religion to hold sincere beliefs.”121 Consequently, the generic preference
in favor of, or of course bias against, adherents of organized religion over
those whose religious beliefs are not neatly tied, or tied at all, to an
organized religion is a form of impermissible discrimination.122 As one
commentator explained, within the constitutional context, “if a state
wanted to offer a religious exemption it could not limit the exemption to
organized religions because that discriminated in favor of certain religious
beliefs and against others.”123
C. Religious Discrimination in the Promulgation of Vaccine
Exemptions Specifically
Having surveyed the law regarding religious discrimination in the
promulgation and administration of religious exemptions generally, let us
now apply these principles to the question of religious exemptions to
vaccination mandates, specifically under New York law.

118. See id. at 379.
119. Id. at 378.
120. Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
Although
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm [https://perma.cc/TN3V-FKZZ].
religious exemptions need not extend to non-religious ethical or moral beliefs, the core point
remains: laws against religious discrimination are not denomination specific; they protect
religious believers of all faiths, organized or not. See id.
121. $Susan E. Prince, Preaching Religious Views at Work, HR WIRE (Feb. 11, 2002).
122. See Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of
Patients, Parents, and Healers, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 691 (1993).
123. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain:
Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS
L.J. 1551, 1568 (2014); see also Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 855 F. Supp. 2d 44,
54 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that New York City schools violated the First Amendment by
limiting the use of their facilities to only certain religious groups because the policy was not
neutral and “discriminate[d] between those religions that fit the ‘ordained’ model of formal
religious worship services . . . and those religions whose worship practices are far less
structured” (internal citations omitted)).
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Setting aside the question of harassment (as outside the scope of this
Article), let us turn to the parameters of a lawful vaccine exemption based
upon religion under section 296(4) of the New York Human Rights Law.
Recall that section 296(4) makes it unlawful for an educational institution,
such as a private college or university, to “deny the use of its facilities to
any person otherwise qualified . . . by reason of his . . . religion.”124 A
vaccination mandate containing no religious exemptions would not seem
to run afoul of section 296(4) because it would not serve to deny the use
of college or university facilities on the basis of religion.125 Rather, the
denial of the use of school facilities to any particular student would be
based upon the student’s status as unvaccinated. The student’s reasons for
not being vaccinated, be they religiously predicated or otherwise, would
simply not factor into the school’s denial of use.
However, the legal landscape changes dramatically once an
educational institution promulgates a religious exemption.
Such
promulgation changes the status quo from one in which a student’s
religious objections to vaccination have no bearing upon his or her
eligibility to use the institution’s facilities to one in which the student’s
religious objections becomes a determining factor. And because of New
York’s prohibition on religious discrimination regarding the use of school
facilities,126 religious exemptions, once announced, must be extended to
all genuine and sincere takers. Put differently, the religious exemption
cannot serve as a screen by which some students can be denied access to
the educational institution’s facilities, and others permitted access, on
account of their divergent religious beliefs. In light of the religious
exemption, it is no longer the unvaccinated status of a religious student
that bars him or her from use of a school’s facilities. Rather, the school’s
assessment of that student’s religious beliefs becomes the determining
factor. Such assessment may extend to verifying the genuineness and
sincerity of the student’s beliefs, but it cannot extend to discretionary
favoring or disfavoring of beliefs for purposes of awarding the
exemption.127 Certainly, a preference for, or aversion to, particular
religious denominations is unlawfully discriminatory. But as Larson and
its progeny teaches, so also is a preference for large religions versus small
religions, and organized religions versus religions lacking a structure or

124. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(4) (McKinney 2018).
125. Of course, this requires a fact-specific inquiry. A vaccine mandate imposed for the
specific purpose of excluding students of a particular religious sect, for example, would clearly
seem to violate section 296(4) of the New York Human Rights Law.
126. See EXEC. § 296(4).
127. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 381 (4th
Cir. 2003); Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328,
1375–76 (N.D. Ga. 2012); Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003).
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hierarchy.128 In short, any approach that prejudices one set of genuine and
sincere religious beliefs over another constitutes unlawful discrimination
based on religion.
A concrete example can help clarify. Consider the extreme
hypothetical of a university that announced a religious exemption to its
vaccination mandate, but one only available to Episcopalians with
religious beliefs precluding them from taking the vaccine in question. Is
there any question that such an exemption would violate section 296(4) of
New York’s Human Rights Law? Could the university possibly prevail
by arguing that its rejections of exemption requests for Jewish, Roman
Catholic, Muslim, or Evangelical students were not on account of their
religion, but rather on account of their (un)vaccinated status? Of course
not—the only relevant difference between these objecting students and the
objecting Episcopalian students would be their religion.
Let us consider an opposite extreme example. Imagine a college with
a religious exemption policy to a vaccination mandate that specifically
excluded Lutherans from seeking an exemption. Could such a policy
conceivably be upheld? To ask the question is to answer it: of course not,
as this too would constitute blatant discrimination among students on the
basis of religion.
What about a preference for, or bias against, individuals on account
of their membership in an organized religion, generally speaking? Could
an educational institution condition a religious exemption, in whole or in
part, upon a student’s membership in an organized religion? Could it
exclude from consideration all applications from students whose religious
beliefs are not connected to any “name brand” faith tradition? Absolutely
not—this would be strictly forbidden as a form of religious discrimination.
Finally, let us consider the more likely situation of a religious
exemption policy that only made exemptions available to students who
oppose immunization in general,129 versus to students who opposed
receipt of a particular vaccine currently being mandated. As becomes
readily apparent, this is simply a manifestation of the first two examples
but stripped of denominational labels. That is, instead of declaring that
only students belonging to Religion X may claim the exemption—or that
students belonging to Religion Y may not claim the exemption—the
school would be substituting an irrelevant proxy to do exactly the same
thing. Just as a school could not limit an exemption to Jewish students
alone, it could not limit an exemption to students whose faiths recognize
Saturday as the Sabbath.
128. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244; Religious Discrimination, supra note 120; Nobel, supra
note 122, at 700–01.
129. See Ben Finley, Church of the First Born Practices a Strict Faith, RELIGION NEWS
SERV. (Apr. 24, 1996), https://religionnews.com/1996/04/24/church-of-the-first-bornpractices-a-strict-faith/ [https://perma.cc/BX36-82UJ].
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With respect to the COVID-19 vaccination mandates currently in
circulation, whether a student has a religious objection to some other or
all other vaccinations is simply irrelevant. All that matters is whether the
student has a religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccine that is just as
genuine and just as sincere as any other student articulating a religious
objection thereto. Any attempt to limit qualifying exemptions to students
whose religions oppose all vaccinations in general is little more than
exercising preference to one group of denominations over another based
upon a factor unrelated to the merits of the exemption. As has become
clear, that constitutes impermissible religious discrimination.
IV.

UNLAWFUL ADMINISTRATION OF A RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION POLICY
Even though a religious exemption policy may be facially
problematic, it is possible that those responsible for administering it could
do so in such a way as to prevent discriminatory results. Conversely, the
opposite is possible as well: that an otherwise facially lawful policy could
be administered in a discriminatory way. To this possibility we now turn
our attention.
There are four broad and overlapping ways in which administrators
of a religious exemption policy might take an otherwise lawful policy and
apply it in an unlawfully discriminatory way: (a) by playing favorites
among religious beliefs opposed to vaccination, crediting some while
discrediting others; (b) by refusing exemptions to those students whose
personal religious beliefs diverge from the denomination to which they
belong; (c) by dismissing the religious beliefs of those students who do
not belong to a hierarchical religion with clear teaching on vaccination;
and (d) by denying exemptions to students whose denominations impose
upon them a religious obligation to follow their properly formed
consciences with regard to vaccination.
A. Favoring or Disfavoring Based upon Religious Beliefs Per Se
The first and most easily recognizable way for an otherwise lawful
policy to be discriminatorily administered would be to deny vaccination
exemptions for some students who submitted qualifying requests while
granting them to other students, with the only material difference being
their different religious beliefs. Siddiqi, discussed previously, provides an
analogous example to that.130 Denying a Christian student who objected
to a particular vaccine because of its connection to abortion,131 while
130. See Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (where an employee sued his employer for granting only leave requests made by
employees of certain religions, but not for Muslims, despite a general policy that allowed
employees to take time off to observe their respective religious holidays).
131. See, e.g., Athanasius Schneider, Covid Vaccines: “The Ends Cannot Justify the
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providing an exemption to a Muslim student who objected to the same
vaccine because of the use of pork gelatin in its manufacture132 would also
be an example of this. A related form of the same problem would extend
the exemption only to students of faiths who oppose all vaccination,
versus a student whose faith is opposed to one particular vaccine. For
reasons to be discussed, this too constitutes denominational
discrimination.133
B. Discrimination Against Heretics
The second way an otherwise lawful religious exemption policy
could be made unlawful would be to execute it in such a way as to deny
an exemption to those students whose good faith religious beliefs
somehow diverge from the religious denomination that the student
generally identifies with. Put bluntly, this might be considered
discrimination against heretics.134 Or, more accurately, discrimination
against those students perceived, by the university acting in a magisterial
capacity, as heretics.
Consider, for example, a university’s decision to deny religious
exemptions brought by all students who identify as Catholic. “Catholics
need not apply” might not be written into the policy guidelines explicitly,
but the policy could be administered in such a way as to effectively
preclude any Catholic student from claiming the exemption. The
college’s rationale would not necessarily be antipathy towards its Catholic
students, but might rather be that its administration has assessed Catholic
teaching, perhaps via a review of certain bishops’ statements, and has
concluded that the Catholic Church has no opposition to the vaccines
being mandated.
Would this be permissible under section 296(4) of New York’s
Human Rights Law if challenged by a Catholic student who genuinely and
sincerely believes the vaccine is wrongful based upon their own
understanding of the Catholic religion? Could the college, potentially a
fully secular institution at that, tell the Catholic student that his
understanding of his Catholic religion was “incorrect” and thereby deny
the student an exemption?

Means,” CRISIS MAG. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.crisismagazine.com/2020/covid-vaccinesthe-ends-cannot-justify-the-means [https://perma.cc/XBL6-SQHQ].
132. See, e.g., Victoria Milko, Concern Among Muslims over Halal Status of COVID-19
Vaccine, ABC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2020, 5:51 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/
concern-muslims-halal-status-covid-19-vaccine-74826269 [https://perma.cc/B6CH-35W7].
133. See infra Section IV.C.
134. “[A] professed believer who maintains religious opinions contrary to those accepted
by his church or rejects doctrines prescribed by his church.” Heretic, WEBSTER’S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1989).
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As a threshold matter, religious questions can be notoriously
complicated, and intrareligious disputes are far from uncommon.135 It
takes an uncanny amount of hubris for a university administrator to
arrogate upon himself or herself the authority to decide what a
denomination’s religiously binding teaching is upon a given subject, and
to enforce that decision upon a student. More importantly, however, even
if an administrator assumes such an inquisitorial role, religious beliefs
labeled heretical by the university are not per se disingenuous or insincere,
nor are they somehow entitled to less protection against discrimination
than orthodox religious beliefs. It is the individual student who is
requesting the exemption—not the religious leaders whom the college
may be referring to in such a situation. Consequently, it is the student’s
beliefs that are paramount—not those of any particular clergyman,
regardless of his status within the student’s church. Indeed, few can be
unaware of the phenomenon, especially in America, of individuals
adopting heterodox religious beliefs at odds with the official teaching of
their particular denomination.136
In short, it would constitute an act of unlawful discrimination for a
university to deny a student’s religious exemption request based solely
upon the student’s religious affiliation. If the student’s exemption request
satisfies the university’s guidelines by establishing that the student holds
a good faith, sincere religious vaccination objection, the university must
grant the exemption request regardless of university’s determination that
the student’s beliefs diverge from the sect or denomination the student
identifies with.137
C. Denigration of Non-Hierarchical Religions
The third way an otherwise lawful religious exemption policy could
be discriminatorily administered is by limiting exemptions solely to
students belonging to those specific denominations that impose upon their
adherents avoidance of the vaccine in question.138 As will be discussed,
drawing up a list of religions for which exemption requests will be
135. See, e.g., These Four Cardinals Asked Pope Francis to Clarify ‘Amoris Laetitia’,
CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/
news/34915/these-four-cardinals-asked-pope-francis-to-clarify-amoris-laetitia
[https://perma.cc/3PDN-8TZA] (reporting upon four cardinals’ request that Pope Francis clarify
certain statements contained in his Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia because of their
apparent incongruity with Catholic teaching).
136. See Julie Byrne, Indie Catholicism Is Real: Married Clergy, LGBT Ordination, and
Sacramental
Justice
for
All,
RELIGION
DISPATCHES
(Oct.
21,
2016),
https://religiondispatches.org/indie-catholicism-is-real-married-clergy-lgbt-ordination-andsacramental-justice-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/3RCN-CB6J] (discussing the proliferation of
“independent” Catholic communities that embrace practices and beliefs contrary to those of the
Catholic Church).
137. Assuming such guidelines are themselves lawful.
138. See Finley, supra note 129.
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approved, and a list of religions for which exemption requests will not be
approved, patently constitutes discrimination based on religion.139 For a
student’s religious beliefs may not conform exactly with his or her
denominational preference. And the university would be engaged in
unlawful religious discrimination by resolving exemption requests based
upon a student’s general denominational preference instead of his or her
genuinely held religious beliefs specific to the vaccine in question.140
However, such an approach would also be problematic because of its
effects upon students who belong to no particular organized religion—
nondenominational believers, or “nones.”141 Their religious beliefs would
not be credited, nor entitled to fair and equal treatment, because of their
lack of connection with a particular denomination. Consequently, those
students whose religious beliefs are not linked to a hierarchical
organization empowered to make proclamations regarding vaccination
would be unjustly discriminated against.142
Perhaps the best case on point for this proposition is Kolbeck v.
Kramer.143 In Kolbeck, plaintiff sought a religious exemption from his
university’s medical testing requirements.144 The university’s position
was that only Christian Scientists could claim such an exemption,145 and
since plaintiff was not a Christian Scientist, his purported religion was not
a “true faith.”146
The court reminded the parties that the “State or any instrumentality
thereof cannot, under any circumstances, show a preference of one
religion over another.”147 It then proceeded to castigate the university for
doing exactly that:
The suggestion that plaintiff does not have a bona fide religion to
qualify for this exemption, in view of the facts and the law on this
question, indicates an arbitrary and capricious policy for a State
University. There is no right on the part of a political subdivision of
a State to take discriminate action against a person in reference to his
religious views. Membership in a recognized religious group cannot

139. See infra Section IV.D.
140. See supra Section IV.B.
141. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 17 (2013)
[hereinafter The Naked Private Square].
142. See supra text accompanying note 129.
143. See Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964), modified
214 A.2d 408 (N.J. 1965).
144. Id. at 889.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 891.
147. Id. at 893.

COLOMBO (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/25/22 9:23 AM

WHEN EXEMPTIONS DISCRIMINATE

319

be required as a condition of exemption from vaccination under statute
and constitutional law.148

D. Discrediting of Contingent Religious Obligations
A fourth way of discriminatorily administering an otherwise lawful
religious exemption policy would be by discrediting the beliefs of those
students who belong to faiths in which adherents are not clearly and
specifically enjoined from taking a particular vaccine, but who instead are
under an equally serious religious obligation to assess their individual
consciences given their unique personal situation. Put differently, the
policy would discriminate against faiths and belief systems that require
personal discernment in such situations before religious obligations
attach.
For example, the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that “[a]
human being must always obey the certain judgment of his conscience. If
he were deliberately to act against it, he would condemn himself.”149 As
the renowned Catholic apologist Peter Kreeft has explained, our
conscience is derived from God, and, consequently, “has absolute,
exceptionless, binding moral authority over us, demanding unqualified
obedience.”150 Consequently, regardless of what one’s pastor might teach
or believe, if a Catholic student’s religiously formed conscience requires
him or her to abstain from vaccination, that student has a religious
obligation to so abstain,151 and should qualify for a religious exemption.152
This issue has arisen in connection with the COVID-19 vaccines because,
as of this writing, all those available in the United States can be linked to
a fetal cell line originally derived from a procured abortion.153 The
148. Id. (emphasis in original).
149. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1790 (1994).
150. Peter Kreeft, The Argument from Conscience, in FUNDAMENTALS OF THE FAITH
(Ignatius Press 1988), https://www.catholiceducation.org/en/religion-and-philosophy/
apologetics/the-argument-from-conscience.html [https://perma.cc/526M-3XAV].
151. See John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 303, 323 (1998) (noting that both Christians and Catholics are taught that judgments of
conscience are “illumined by faith,” and that Catholics are further taught to obey such
judgments).
152. Although Pope Francis personally concluded that receipt of the COVID-19 vaccine
is morally licit, he, in another context, expounded traditional Catholic teaching when he
proclaimed:
There is sin, even for those who have no faith, when conscience is not followed.
Listening to and obeying conscience means deciding in the face of what is
understood to be good or evil. It is on the basis of this choice that the goodness or
evil of our actions is determined.
Francis, Letter to a Non-Believer, VATICAN (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/letters/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130911_eugenio-scalfari.html
[https://perma.cc/3BQ3-MFCD].
153. See Guidance on Getting the COVID-19 Vaccine, CHILD. OF GOD FOR LIFE,
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Colorado Catholic Conference (the “united voice of the Catholic bishops
of Colorado”)154 ably addressed this very situation. In a letter to the
Catholic faithful concerning COVID-19 vaccination mandates, the
Conference underscored traditional Catholic teachings on the subject of
vaccination, declaring that “[t]here is a moral duty to refuse the use of
medical products, including certain vaccines, that are created using human
cells lines derived from abortion . . . .”155 A limited exception to this duty
exists “only under case-specific conditions,” and as such “the use of some
COVID-19 vaccines is morally acceptable under certain
circumstances.”156 Paramount in determining the Catholic student’s
religious obligation with regard to COVID-19 vaccines, therefore, is the
student’s assessment of his or her particular situation and the judgment of
the student’s conscience. Once this judgment has been formed, the
student is “morally required to obey his or her conscience.”157 In light of
the preceding, the Colorado Catholic Conference took the additional step
of providing a letter template “available to be signed by pastors of the
Faithful if a Catholic wants a written record that they are seeking
exemption on religious grounds” from a COVID-19 vaccination
mandate.158
No better example of this situation, and the confusion it can engender
among those charged with adjudicating religious exemption requests, can
be provided than that of the case Healy v. United States Coast Guard.159
Although this case concerns a government actor (the U.S. Coast Guard),
and although it was brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
the gravamen of the complaint was the discriminatory approach that
defendant took in evaluating the plaintiff’s exemption request.160 Healy’s
application for a preliminary injunction read as follows:
Lt. Cdr. Healy submitted a religious exemption request because the
Hepatitis A vaccines that might be used on him were derived from

https://cogforlife.org/guidance/ [https://perma.cc/YX4W-ACCU]; CHARLOTTE LOZIER INST.,
COVID-19 VACCINE CANDIDATES AND ABORTION-DERIVED CELL LINES (2021),
https://s27589.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/COVID-19-Vaccine-Candidates-andAbortion-Derived-Cell-Lines.pdf [https://perma.cc/U969-RKJ6].
154. Who We Are, COLO. CATH. CONF. (2021), https://cocatholicconference.org/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/TH3P-F7NA].
155. A Letter from the Bishops of Colorado on COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates, COLO.
CATH. CONF. (Aug. 5, 2021), https://cocatholicconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/218-5_Letter_from_CO_bishops-on_vaccine_mandates_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3GN4W8J].
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Application for Preliminary Injunction, Healy v. U.S. Coast Guard, No.
1:08CV00001 (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2008), 2008 WL 7184974.
160. See id.
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cells taken from the lung tissue of a child of 14 weeks gestation who
was dissected upon his elective abortion . . . . Lt. Cdr. Healy is a
practicing Catholic who strongly opposes abortion, and believes that
if he receives one of these vaccines he would be impermissibly
participating in the evil of abortion, and in societal structures that
facilitate abortion, in violation of his conscience . . . . Therefore, he
sent a memo explaining the Catholic principles that counsel against
his cooperation in an abortion in this way. His request satisfied the
Coast Guard’s requirements for submitting such a request.
Defendants, through Captain Brent Pennington, denied Lt. Cdr.
Healy’s religious exemption request. Captain Pennington denied the
request solely because of his theological disagreement with Lt. Cdr.
Healy about Catholic teaching. Captain Pennington denied Lt. Cdr.
Healy’s request precisely because Lt. Cdr. Healy did not share Captain
Pennington’s view of the implications of Catholic orthodoxy. Captain
Pennington declared that, in his view, Catholic teaching “does not
state that these immunizations are against the religious tenets of the
Catholic Church.” In doing so, Captain Pennington also implicitly
communicated that only members of churches or religions which
present institutional condemnations of the vaccine at issue qualify for
religious exemption. Thus, Captain Pennington has excluded
members of the Catholic Church (and others like it) from the religious
exemption policy, because the Church sets forth defining general
ethical principles against abortion-derived vaccines and leaves it to its
members to apply these principles to their particular circumstances.
Captain Pennington’s foray into Catholic theology is in no way
authorized by the Coast Guard’s religious exemption policy, which
simply calls for the religious objector to state the religious beliefs and
tenets motivating his objection. Moreover, [d]efendants’ decision
blatantly violates federal constitutional and statutory protections.
Defendants have no compelling or even rational interest in
discriminating against Catholics and declaring the proper
interpretation of Catholic theology.161

Healy complained that the Coast Guard’s “imposition of
discrimination upon a facially permissive policy” was “manifestly
unfair.”162 He criticized Coast Guard officials for acting as “arbiters of
religious orthodoxy, probing whether a church’s doctrines are sufficiently
opposed to vaccination and whether the applicant has interpreted those
doctrines correctly.”163 In summation, Healy asserted that the defendants
have imposed a rule that discriminates among religious beliefs, questions
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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and purports to decide the definition of true Catholic belief, forces him or
her to violate his deep commitment to the sacredness of human life, and
is unjustified by the text of their religious exemption Instruction that
allows religious personnel to object to vaccination.164
Upon these facts, Healy requested a preliminary injunction against
the Coast Guard to prevent adverse action against him for refusing the
Hepatitis A vaccine.165 Six days later, the government agreed “not to
vaccinate or take any adverse action against [Healy] until such time as the
case is decided on the merits.”166 In return, the motion for an injunction
was withdrawn.167 Later that year, Healy received official notification that
the Coast Guard “would reverse their previous decision denying him a
religious exemption from the Hepatitis-A vaccine.”168
***
One can recognize why a university may be tempted to adopt some
of the approaches set forth above. A bright line approach,169 for example,
permits a university to draw up a list of religions for which exemption
requests may be approved and a list of religions for which exemption
requests will be denied. This simplifies the administration of its
exemption program tremendously. Further, it can help the university
navigate the difficult task of assessing the sincerity of a student claiming
to be of a certain religion, but who asserts a religious objection not clearly
found in that religion’s teachings. But New York’s Human Rights Law
does not permit an exception to their prohibitions against discrimination
predicated upon administrability concerns.170
In assessing a claimant’s request for a religious exemption, the
decision-maker in question does have the right to assess the sincerity of
the claimant’s beliefs and assertions.171 But such an assessment can be an
occasion for mischief, providing a pretext for discrimination on the

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Healy v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. 1:08CV00001 (D.D.C. dismissed May 9, 2008).
167. Id.
168. Debi Vinnedge, Military Exemption Allowed, CHILD. OF GOD FOR LIFE (May 12,
2008), https://cogforlife.org/2008/05/12/military-exemption-allowed/ [https://perma.cc/F9X69B7J].
169. See supra Section IV.B.
170. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290–301 (McKinney 2018).
171. Hillel Y. Levin, Private Schools’ Role and Rights in Setting Vaccination Policy: A
Constitutional and Statutory Puzzle, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1607, 1628 (2020) (recognizing,
however, that the limited nature of the rule “strips adjudicators of one crucial tool they would
use in other contexts requiring a judgment as to a witness’s honesty, and thus makes the
endeavor more difficult”).
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grounds of “insincerity.”172 For that reason, “the courts have made it clear
that sincerity inquiries must be narrow, going only to the question of
whether a claimant for a religious exemption honestly believes that her
religious beliefs prohibit her from engaging in certain behavior.”173 In
doing so, “decision makers may not infer insincerity of a religious belief
from its implausibility.”174 The Supreme Court made this point forcefully
in United States v. Ballard, famously explaining as follows:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible,
if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject
to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then
the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the
triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The
First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of
religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position.175

In sum, means other than “religious profiling” must be utilized to
assess the merits and credibility of exemption requests. These could
include, perhaps, the request of letters attesting to the student’s beliefs by
others who know him, or some sort of documented history of acting upon
these same beliefs in the past. But to force a belief upon the student that
he or she does not have, or to deny the credibility of the student’s assertion
of a belief just because it fails to, in the university’s estimation, conform
itself to the “official” teaching of an organized religion, is deeply
problematic and a violation of New York law.176
Similarly, one can understand why educational institutions might,
while stopping short of drawing up formal lists of religions from which
exemptions will be granted or denied, gravitate towards practices that only
grant exemption requests hailing from those students whose religions set

172. Cf. Baer-Stefanov v. White, No. 08C3886, 2009 WL 3462421, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 22, 2009) (finding potentially unlawful an exemption regime that empowered the secretary
of state to “determine[] which religious orders or sects have . . . bona fide religious convictions”
justifying an exemption from state’s driver licensing laws).
173. Levin, supra note 171.
174. Id.
175. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
176. In its nonbinding advice to employers, the United States Equal Opportunity
Commission has specifically addressed this very issue:
An employer . . . should not assume that an employee is insincere simply because
some of his or her practices deviate from the commonly followed tenets of his or
her religion, or because the employee adheres to some common practices but not
others. As noted, courts have held that “Title VII protects more than . . . practices
specifically mandated by an employee’s religion.”
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2021-3, SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION (2021) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Anderson v. U.S.F.
Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001)), https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/section-12-religious-discrimination [https://perma.cc/ZR7F-KVHU].

COLOMBO (DO NOT DELETE)

324

5/25/22 9:23 AM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:293

forth clear-cut, black-and-white teachings about vaccination. This too can
help the institution determine both the existence and the credibility of a
student’s professed religious belief.177 It could also serve to disqualify
many otherwise qualified applicants from receiving exemptions—and
keeping the numbers down on exemption approvals is most likely a
priority of the institution. But again, ease of administrability does not
excuse a religious discrimination. Nor does a desire to artificially depress
the number of exemptions awarded. Students whose religious beliefs are
more complicated and more nuanced than others cannot be discriminated
against on account of those objectives. In its nonbinding guidance to
employers faced with the very same challenge, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission advised the following:
Because the definition of religion is broad and protects beliefs,
observances, and practices with which the employer may be
unfamiliar, the employer should ordinarily assume that an employee’s
request for religious accommodation is based on a sincerely held
religious belief. If, however, an employee requests religious
accommodation, and an employer has an objective basis for
questioning either the religious nature or the sincerity of a particular
belief, observance, or practice, the employer would be justified in
seeking additional supporting information.178

As per one commentator who succinctly summarized the relevant
legal landscape:
In effect, courts allow individuals to define the meaning of “religion”
for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act. For example, inter-group
disputes over religious beliefs do not preclude successful claims. Nor
does the fact that the beliefs in question are not mandated by the
plaintiff’s religion. Indeed, protected religious beliefs need not be part
of an organized religion at all.179

177. An issue outside the scope of this Article is the definition of “religion” generally.
The prevailing approach within the courts is to use a “functional” definition of religion, which
compares the role that the belief in question “plays in the individual’s or group’s life” as
compared to the role played by traditional religions in the life of believers, with the qualifier
that the belief be somehow tethered to the supernatural. See Ethan Blevins, A Fixed Meaning
of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 26 (2016); TRIBE, supra
note 81, at 1182. For a deeper discussion of this subject, see Forgive Us Our Sins, supra note
*.
178. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 176.
179. Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 145, 172 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO
VACCINE MANDATES
This final Part will critically examine a pair of actual religious
exemption policies to vaccination mandates and assess their compliance
with New York law. A particularly good one hails from Syracuse
University, and a particularly bad one hails from Hofstra University. As
a predicate to that, however, this Part will first review the exemptions
promulgated by New York State itself as part of its statutory regime of
college vaccinations.
A. New York State’s Statutory Religious Exemption to College
Vaccination
Precedent has established that “the state may require vaccinations for
all college students without granting religious exemptions, but if it grants
such exemptions it may not prefer one religion over another.”180 This
flows ineluctably from the First Amendment, pursuant to which such
preferential treatment would violate both the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.181 To this end, New York has promulgated a
religious exemption to its state-imposed roster of vaccines, which must be
honored if an applicant meets its criteria.182 This does not bear directly
upon the issue of religious exemptions promulgated by private educational
institutions, but nevertheless provides us with an example worthy of
examination. The New York State exemption is summarized as follows:
A student may be exempt from vaccination if, in the opinion of the
institution, that student or student’s parent(s) or guardian of those less
than 18 years old holds genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are
contrary to the practice of immunization. The student requesting
exemption may or may not be a member of an established religious
organization. Requests for exemptions must be written and signed by
the student if 18 years of age or older, or parent(s), or guardian if under
the age of 18. The institution may require supporting documents. It
is not required that a religious exemption statement be notarized. In
the event of an outbreak, religious exempt individuals should be
protected from exposure. This may include exclusion from classes or
campus.183
180. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1626 n.285 (1989) (citing Kolbeck v. Kramer, 214 A.2d 408 (N. J. 1965) (per
curiam)).
181. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993).
182. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2165(9) (McKinney 2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 10, § 66-2.2(e) (2021).
183. Section I - Requirements, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, (Aug. 2018),
https://www.health.ny.gov/prevention/immunization/handbook/section_1_requirements.htm
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New York’s approach is not uncommon—many states recognize
religious exemptions along similar lines.184
The New York religious exemption wisely limits an institution’s
assessment of an exemption application to the ascertainment of “genuine
and sincere religious beliefs” on the part of the student.185 In other words,
the college or university in question may not attempt to challenge the
student’s understanding of his or her religion, nor engage in any sort of
theological second-guessing.
The New York exemption also acknowledges that “[t]he student
requesting exemption may or may not be a member of an established
religious organization.”186 This is important because it precludes an
institution from limiting exemptions to students drawn from organized
religions; not every student with genuine and sincere religious beliefs will
have a published catechism to refer to, or a religious leader from whom a
letter in support can be procured.
Notable is the exemption’s phraseology that the mandate need not
apply to “a person who holds genuine and sincere religious beliefs which
are contrary to the practices herein required.”187 This suggests that the
exemption is only available for those students who oppose, wholesale,
“the practice of immunization,” and not available for those students who
oppose a particular vaccine.188 Semantically, however, this provision is
much more limited. Very simply, one can argue that a student who finds
certain vaccines religiously acceptable, while finding other vaccines
religiously unacceptable, opposes “the practice of immunization” if such
term is defined as the practice of receiving every recommended vaccine.
That student could be said to merely find certain individual vaccines
religiously acceptable while opposing the generalized “practice of
immunization.” Those vaccinations would be exceptions to the student’s
general rule of opposition.
[https://perma.cc/UPA9-F6L5].
184. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 694.210 (2002):
A student may be exempted from the immunization requirements specified in
this Part upon acceptance by the designated recordkeeping office of a written and
signed statement by the student (or the student’s parent or guardian, if the student
is a minor) detailing the student’s objection to immunization on religious grounds.
The objection must set forth the specific religious belief that conflicts with the
immunization. The religious objection may be personal and need not be directed
by the tenets of an established religious organization. General philosophical or
moral reluctance to allow immunizations will not provide a sufficient basis for an
exception to statutory requirements.
185. PUB. HEALTH § 2165(9); tit. 10, § 66-2.2(e).
186. Section I - Requirements, supra note 183.
187. PUB. HEALTH § 2165(9).
188. Section I - Requirements, supra note 183. Indeed, the New York State Department
of Health, in summarizing the meaning of New York statutory and regulation language, utilized
the exact language: “contrary to the practice of immunization.” Id.
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Semantics aside, the problematic repercussions of interpreting
“practice of immunization” as it sounds are obvious. Consider the case of
an orthodox Jewish or Muslim student who opposed the receipt of a
particular vaccine because it was derived from pork and/or contained pork
gelatin.189 No court would uphold a vaccination exemption regime that
made exemptions available to only certain religions (such as members of
the Church of the First Born, who do in fact object to all forms of
vaccination on religious grounds)190 but not to other religions (such as
Orthodox Jews and Muslims, who have more selective objections to
vaccination). This would be a form of impermissible denominational
preference.191
B. A Model Exemption: Syracuse University
Syracuse University provides an example of a privately promulgated
religious exemption policy to a mandatory, university-imposed
vaccination that comports well with New York’s Human Rights Law. The
policy, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Syracuse University requires individuals accessing their campus
facilities to get a COVID-19 vaccine. The facilities include, for
example, dining halls, recreational facilities, gyms, classrooms, and
instructional areas. This requirement is extended to SUNY-ESF
students who would access and use those campus facilities.
Students may request either a medical or religious exemption.
1. Medical exemption is allowed if a physician submits a written,
signed, and dated statement indicating that, in their professional
opinion, immunization is medically contraindicated and would
endanger the health of the individual.
2. Religious exemption is allowed if a student (or parent/guardian if
under age 18) submits a written, signed, and dated statement that an
immunization conflicts with sincerely held religious beliefs.
Indicate which exemption you are requesting.
Medical Exemption
___I am requesting exemption from the COVID-19 vaccine
requirements for medical reasons. Please see attached statement from
my personal physician regarding my request for medical exemption.
—OR—

189. See Milko, supra note 132.
190. See Finley, supra note 129.
191. See supra Section IV.A.
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Religious Exemption
___I am requesting exemption from the COVID-19 vaccine
requirements for sincerely held religious reasons. Please see attached
statement regarding my request for religious exemption.192

Syracuse’s policy requires only the information necessary to assess
the sincerity of the student’s objection to vaccination. The policy’s
requirements are reasonable and not unduly burdensome, broadcasting a
certain sincerity on the part of the university regarding its exemption
policy.
Although it does not explicitly state that students of any religious
background may apply for the exemption, Syracuse’s policy requires
nothing that could be deemed prejudicial for or against students from an
organized religion. It does not, for example, require a letter from a
religious leader.193 This is critically important, as it avoids the pitfall of
discriminating against particular religious beliefs on account of their lack
of association with an organized denomination.194
Finally, Syracuse University’s policy is not worded in such a way that
suggests the exemption is only available to students whose religious
beliefs preclude the receipt of all vaccines—explicitly observing that a
student may have an objection to “an immunization.”195 This too helps
prevent the university from violating New York Human Rights Law by
discriminatorily preferring one denomination, or group of denominations,
over another.196
C. A Problematic Exemption: Hofstra University
In contrast to the religious exemptions promulgated by New York and
Syracuse University, the Hofstra University exemption gets much wrong,
and is arguably in striking noncompliance with state law. In its entirety,
the Hofstra exemption reads as follows:
Hofstra University policy requires that all students, other than
those who are in entirely online programs or are taking all classes
remotely, must be vaccinated before returning to campus for the fall.
A student may be exempted from the University’s vaccination
requirement if, in the opinion of the University, that student holds

192. WAIVER OF RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22. The form also requires the student to
initial four waivers, indicating this understanding that certain restrictions may be imposed upon
him on account of his unvaccinated status. See id. These restrictions may be problematic for
other reasons, but do not implicate the issue of religious discrimination.
193. See id.
194. See supra Section IV.C.
195. See WAIVER OF RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 22 (emphasis added).
196. See supra Section IV.A.
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genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the practice
of immunization.
Objections based on personal beliefs, sociological grounds, morals or
philosophy fall outside the scope of religious exemption.
Instructions
For consideration of a religious exemption, students must provide all
of the following:
1. A statement signed and written by the student:
• Stating that the student holds religious beliefs contrary to
vaccination;
• Demonstrating that the student’s religious beliefs are genuinely
and sincerely contrary to vaccination; and
• Detailing the religious principles that form the basis of the
objection to vaccination.
2. A document from the religious organization to which the student
belongs supporting the basis of the religious beliefs which are contrary
to vaccination, which must be signed by a religious leader of the
religion, and which must include the name, address, and phone
number/email of the religious leader.
Hofstra University will not accept or consider letters or signatures
from parents or legal guardians for religious exemption requests,
unless student is under 18 years of age. In such a case, both the student
and parent/guardian must review and sign the applicable
documentation and this form as indicated below.
The University reserves the right at any time up until a decision has
been made to request additional supporting documentation.197

The first impression made by the Hofstra exemption is its partial
unintelligibility. The policy absurdly declares: “Objections based on
personal beliefs, sociological grounds, morals or philosophy fall outside
the scope of religious exemption.”198 What are religious beliefs if not
“personal beliefs?” Are religious objections supposed to be based upon
197. REQUEST AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 21.
198. Id.
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someone else’s beliefs pursuant to the Hofstra policy, and not one’s own
personal beliefs? And is there anyone who fails to recognize that for
perhaps the vast majority of individuals, their moral beliefs are largely
synonymous with their religious beliefs?199 Even philosophy can be
correlative with religion for many people.200 This nonsensical language
could be salvaged by adding or inferring an additional qualifier such as
“solely” to this text. For example: “Objections based solely upon personal
beliefs, sociological grounds, morals, or philosophy that fall outside the
scope of religious exemptions.” To some, this oversight may be a small
thing; to others, however, it broadcasts that Hofstra crafted the policy with
a particular lack of care and thoughtfulness.
More seriously incongruous with the law is Part 2 of the application,
requiring “[a] document from the religious organization to which the
student belongs supporting the basis of the religious beliefs which are
contrary to vaccination, which must be signed by a religious leader of the
religion, and which must include the name, address, and phone number/
email of the religious leader.”201 This requirement is impermissibly
discriminatory on several grounds.
First, it presupposes the student’s adherence to a “religious
organization” complete with “religious leader[s].” There are few clearer
examples of denominational preference and discrimination based on
religion than this. Treating students who belong to organized religions
differently than those who do not is a form of religious discrimination.202
Second, this policy requires that, even if the student belongs to an
organized religion, the student’s religious beliefs must be perfectly
aligned with that religion’s teaching regarding vaccination. As previously
discussed, the divergence of an individual’s religious beliefs from that of
their religious superiors is not an uncommon phenomenon, especially
among Americans.203 This divergence makes the individual’s religious
beliefs no less genuinely and sincerely held, but may make it much more
difficult for the student to procure the requisite letter from a religious
leader. This too, therefore, constitutes a form of impermissible religious
discrimination—one that I have referred to above as discrimination
against “heretics” because it fails to grant equal regard and respect to those

199. See PEW RSCH. CTR., U.S. PUBLIC BECOMING LESS RELIGIOUS 64 (2015),
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/
[https://perma.cc/K78E-2BBW].
200. See, e.g., LEO XIII, AETERNI PATRIS: ENCYCLICAL OF POPE LEO XIII ON THE
RESTORATION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 1 (1879), https://www.vatican.va/content/leoxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5CW-54R3].
201. REQUEST AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 21.
202. See supra Section IV.C.
203. See supra text accompanying note 136; see also supra Section IV.B.
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students whose religious beliefs veer from the religion to which they
belong.204
CONCLUSION
Colleges and universities in New York may impose vaccination
mandates upon their students. Whether all such mandates are lawful, for
all vaccines, mandated in all circumstances, remains to be seen.
In an era of professed prioritization of diversity, equity, and inclusion
concerns,205 few educational institutions would want to be exposed for
excluding students of faith from their purview. Few would want to find
themselves within the merely two percent of colleges and universities that,
according to one survey, lack religious exemptions to their vaccination
mandates.206 Such might not be socially acceptable and, moreover, would
put the institution at a disadvantage in the competition for tuition and
donor money. Thus, despite the drive by colleges and universities to
impose COVID-19 vaccination mandates upon their students, the vast
majority have promulgated religious exemptions thereto.
Putting aside the question of whether religious exemption by a private
educational institution is required under New York law, once
promulgated, the exemption must comply with New York’s Human
Rights Law—particularly section 296(4) addressing discrimination on the
part of educational institutions.207
Unfortunately, as we have seen, some exemption policies apparently
do not comply with the law.208 Regardless of their motivations, certain
educational institutions appear to believe that their exemption policies
may—one way or another, explicitly or implicitly—discriminate against
particular religions. This belief is manifested primarily via policies that
give preference to organized religions over other religions or give
preference to what the institution has decided are orthodox believers
versus heterodox believers. Typically, institutions demonstrate this
preference by mandating that students produce a letter from a religious
leader.

204. See supra Section IV.B.
205. See Jill Anderson, Harvard EdCast: Colleges as Courageous Spaces, HARV. GRAD.
SCH. OF EDUC. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/19/10/harvard-edcastcolleges-courageous-spaces [https://perma.cc/U66X-QTFS].
206. See Noesekabel & Fenick, supra note 63, at 3663. But see supra text accompanying
notes 205–06 (regarding Hofstra University’s decision to end and revoke all religious
exemptions to its COVID-19 vaccination mandate).
207. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(4) (McKinney 2018).
208. See supra Section V.C. Although the focus of this Article has been on New York
State, it is likely that the problem detailed herein occurs in other states as well—more
specifically, in any states that retain anti-discrimination laws applicable to educational
institutions.
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Concerning even facially lawful exemption policies, educational
institutions must resist the temptation to administer them in unlawful ways
for the sake of convenience, or more nefariously, to simply reduce the
number of exemptions granted to otherwise qualified applicants. Such
problematic methods include:
• Preparing internal lists of “approved” versus “disapproved”
religions for purposes of deciding exemption requests;
• “Religiously profiling” a student by imposing certain religious
beliefs upon that student contrary to the student’s own representations;
• Adopting rules of thumb requiring students seeking an exemption
to be opposed to all immunizations versus a particular vaccination in
question; and
• Denigrating the beliefs of those students that are more nuanced,
turning upon the judgment of their religiously informed consciences,
versus black-and-white denominational teachings.

For many, it is an axiomatic principle of moral philosophy that the
ends cannot be used to justify the means.209 Even if one posits that college
and university administrators are acting with the purest of intentions, they
should not and, at least in New York and other states with similar human
rights legislation, cannot administer a vaccination mandate that
discriminates against students on the basis of religion when adjudicating
exemptions thereto. This lesson in discrimination must cease.

209. See Vera Bergelson, Crimes and Defenses of Rodion Raskolnikov, 85 KY. L.J. 919,
936 (1997).

